Indicators of Risks to Media Pluralism
Media Audience Concentration
Result: High Risk
This indicator aims to assess the concentration of audience and readership across media platforms based on audience share. Concentration is measured by using the nationwide biggest 4 owners in the market.
Why?
This indicator assesses a HIGH risk to media pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to high concentrations in TV, Print, online and Radio markets.
TV: 58%
The TV market in Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly concentrated as the 4 major owners reach the audience share of 58%. The market leader is the Nova BH owned by United Group and it reaches 22% of the audience. BN TV owned by Trišić family has an audience share of 13%. OBN owned by Ivan Ćaleta is the third and it reaches 12% of the audience. The audience share of public broadcaster FTV amounts to 11%.
*The share of top 10 television stations represents 46,91% of the overall television market. Since MOM focuses on the news media in the television market, the audience shares have been recalculated based on the fact that the top 10 television stations would represent 100% of the informative market. The audience share of 58% is attributed to the top 4 players of the market. Audience share for N1 TV is missing and it is not included in the top 10.
Radio: 61,21%
The risk of concentration in the radio market is assessed as high with the four major owners reaching 61,21% of radio audience shares. Radio BIG2 owned by Ljubiša Kragulj has the largest share of 21,44%, Radio BN owned by Trišić family has 15,25%, Adnan Osmanagić's Radio Mix has 12,98% and fourth is Radio Kalman owned by Sanjin Brkić has 11,58% of shares.
*The top 10 radio stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the radios with news programmes) represent an audience share of 48,5% of which four players control 61,21% which indicates a high concentration.
Print: 69%
The print market in Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly concentrated as four major owners reach an audience share of 69%. The leader of the market is the Dnevni Avaz daily outlet owned by Azra Radončić which has an audience of 40%. Glas Srpske majority owned by Kopanja family's Dnevne nezavisne novine company has an audience share of 15%. The third largest audience share of 14,09% is attributed to Euro Blic owned by the Ringier family.
*The top 7 print outlets that cover news in Bosnia and Herzegovina represent an audience share of 22% of which four players control 69% which indicates a high concentration. Audience share for Stav weekly is missing and it is not included in top 7.
Online: 67,7%
The online market in Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly concentrated as four major owners reach an audience share of 67,7%. The leader of the market is by far Klix.ba outlet owned by Šimić brothers which has an audience of 32,2%. Avaz.ba owned by Azra Radončić has an audience share of 20,33%. The third largest news website is Senad Zaimović’s RadioSarajevo.ba with an audience share of 8,47%. Fourth place with 6,7% of shares is shared among four different outlets: Nezavisne.com owned by Kopanja family, N1info.ba owned by United Group, Oslobodjenje.ba owned by Mujo Selimović and Slobodna-bosna.ba owned by Mirha Dedić.
*The top 10 online outlets that cover news in Bosnia and Herzegovina represent 59% of the overall television market which seven players (four sharing the 4th place) control 67,7% which indicates a high concentration.
| LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
|---|---|---|
| Audience concentration in Television (horizontal) | ||
Percentage: 58% | ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. |
| Audience concentration in Radio (horizontal) | ||
Percentage: 61.21% | ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. |
| Readership concentration in newspapers (horizontal) | ||
Percentage: 69% | ||
| If within one country the major 4 Owners have a readership share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a readership share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a readership share above 50%. |
| Audience concentration in Internet (horizontal) | ||
Percentage: 67.7% | ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. |
SOURCES:
Television Audience Measurement, Bosnia and Herzegovina
1.3.2022. - 31.3.2023
Radio Audience Data, Bosnia and Herzegovina, IPSOS
3.2022. - 1.3.2023
Print Readership Bosnia and Herzegovina, IPSOS
3.2022. - 1.3.2023
Online Audience Data Bosnia and Herzegovina, IPSOS
Media Market Concentration
Result: High Risk
This indicator aims to assess the horizontal ownership concentration based on market share which illustrates the economic power of companies/ groups. Concentration is measured for each media sector by adding the market shares of the major owners in the sector.
Why?
TV: The top 4 private owners in the television market are BC Partners, Trišić family, Švrakić family and Ivan Ćaleta. Together they reach a market share of 85,46%, without including public broadcasters. Share of the top 3 private owners within the market that includes public broadcasters is 27,45%. Moreover, public sector broadcasters (FTV, BHT1, RTRS) have a market share of 67,87% over top 10. The total revenue out of all private owners is 52,64 mln BAM, while the revenue of the top 4 is 44,99 mln BAM.
Radio: The top 4 private owners in the radio market are Radio BN’s owner Trišić family, Radio Nes’ owner Kopanja family, Radio RSG’s owner Adnan Osmanagić and Radio BIR’s owner Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They reach a market share of 90,82%. The revenue of Kopanja family’s Nes radio is available only for its company Dnevne nezavisne novine, which includes print, online and radio. Financial data specific to radio stations is not public. The total revenue out of all radio owners is 21,77 mln BAM, while the revenue of the top 4 is 19,8 mln BAM.
Print: The top 4 private owners in the print market are Azra Radončić, Kopanja family, Mujo Selimović and Ringier family, owners of Avaz, Nezavisne novine, Oslobodjenje and Euroblic. They reach a market share of 83,38%. The revenue of Kopanja family’s Nezavisne novine is available only for its company Dnevne nezavisne novine, which includes print, online and radio. Financial data specific to print outlets is not public. The total revenue out of all print media owners is 26,6 mln BAM, while the revenue of the top 4 is 22,18 mln BAM.
Online: The top 4 private owners in the print market are Azra Radončić, Kopanja family, Šimić brothers and Mujo Selimović, owners of Avaz.ba, Nezavisne.com, Klix.ba and Oslobodjenje.ba. They reach a market share of 91%. The revenue of Kopanja family’s Nezavisne.com is available only for its company Dnevne nezavisne novine, which includes print, online and radio.Financial data specific to online outlets is not public. The total revenue of all online media owners is 28,42 mln BAM, while the revenue of the top 4 is 25,92 mln BAM.
| LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH |
|---|---|---|
| Media market concentration in television (horizontal): This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the TV media sector. | ||
| Percentage: 58% | ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. |
| Media market concentration in radio (horizontal) : This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the Radio media sector. | ||
| Percentage: 90.82% | ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. |
| Media market concentration in newspapers (horizontal): This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the print sector. | ||
| Percentage: 83.38% | ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. |
| Media market concentration in Internet Content Providers | ||
| Percentage: 91% | ||
| If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%. | If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. |
SOURCES:
Financial–intelligence Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Agency for intermediary, IT and financial services
Regulatory Safeguards: Media Ownership Concentration
Result: Medium Risk
This indicator assesses the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration ownership and/or control in the different media.
Why?
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a dedicated law to regulate the field of media concentration, or monopoly. The Law on Communications of BiH obliges the Council of Ministers of BiH and Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA BiH, Agency) to promote fair competition and prevent distortion or restriction of competition in the communications sector. The law is limited to telecommunications, radio, broadcasting (including cable television), as well as associated services and facilities. One of the competencies of CRA is the granting of licences. In addition, its task is to “protect the plurality and diversity of the media (restriction of concentration), and above all else, to enable a continuous and uniform development of the radio sector in the country.” The obligation to report to CRA is foreseen for licence users. A failure to inform CRA of certain changes referring to ownership may result in sanctions (e.g. written warning). Licence users are also obliged to submit financial reports to CRA. This Law does not cover print and online media.
The Rule 21/2003 on media concentration of ownership of electronic and print media entered into force on April 1, 2004 and expired in 2006. The short-lived law allowed for a maximum 10% share in case an owner had multiple outlets in the same market, it also stipulated that one natural or legal person cannot be the owner of two or more radio or television stations which have the same population coverage ratio.
All business entities are covered by the Law on Competition of BiH. Articles 12-19 define the term ‘concentration’, including what is considered prohibited concentration, turnover level for control of concentration, as well as measures in case of prohibited concentration. Those provisions do not treat media concentration in a distinct way.
Certain business entities have an obligation to notify the Competition Council of intended mergers and acquisitions that contribute to concentrations, while the Law on Competition provides for eligibility conditions, including the necessary data and business indicators. Companies are obliged to notify the authority on concentration if the total annual income of each of at least two business entities participants to the concentration generated through the sale of goods and/or services in the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina amounts to at least KM 8,000,000, or if their joint participation in the relevant market exceeds 40%; this also refer to media mergers and concentration issues. The law stipulates that a business entity has a dominant position when it holds more than 40% of the market share in the relevant market. Although the dominant position is not prohibited, its abuse is.
There are no special provisions about rules regarding conflict of interests referring to family members. The Law on Conflict of Interests in Governmental Institutions of BiH sets the framework for prevention of conflict of interest, but it was circumvented in the past especially when it comes to print media owners. The experience shows that application of general laws on competition alone is not sufficient, because laws on competition do not count with the special role of the media in the society in creating conditions for a public debate.
The Analytical Report of the European Commission stated that the functioning of the Competition Council is significantly impeded by tight procedural deadlines and ethnic-based decision-making procedures, according to which decisions must be supported by at least one member representing each constituent people in order to have legal effect. The validity of criticism of short deadlines for action is reflected in the fact that, in a certain number of cases, including media concentration cases, the Council failed to render an appropriate decision within the legally set deadline for various reasons. In the said situation, it shall be considered that the concentration is allowed. The absence of a decision on the substance in such situations may point to a potential concern due to a tacit approval of illicit concentration.
A review of available decisions on Competition Council’s web page indicates that although the Law on Competition provides for a possibility to initiate proceedings ex-officio, in all inspected decisions referring to business entities which are in some way associated with media industry, proceedings were initiated at requests by parties. International reports on the situation of the media state that the Competition Council has weak prevention activity in terms of hindering prohibited concentrations. In the case of radio and television, the CRA rules related to the issuing and transferring of licences, may have a certain impact on media concentration. They restrict the partial or complete transfer of licences to another users, by sale or special contract, in all cases when change in the original ownership of licence user exceeds 5% of the share in the said licence. In these cases, the partial transfer of ownership requires a previous written consent by the Agency. While processing the request, the Agency examines the same conditions as in the process of licence issuance. There is no data on licences being refused or revoked in relation to concentration.
As regards the future, there is a Draft Law on Ownership Transparency and Protection of Media Pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina which highlights that the lack of regulation of media ownership prevents the state from adequately regulating ownership concentration, foreign ownership and conflict of interests in the media and related sectors. According to the Draft, market competition should be regulated in such a way that any intended concentration of publishers or a publisher and another undertaking is subject to an obligation to notify of the concentration and obtain concentration permission regardless of the value of the concentration agreement within the meaning of competition regulations (the previously mentioned existing regulations from the Law on Competition specify the amount of income and market share that exceeds 40%).
Regulatory Safeguard Score:
10 out of 20 = Medium Risk (50%).
1 = media-specific regulation/ authority
0.5 = competition-related regulation/ authority
| Nº | Television, Radio, print and Online | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector? | This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the TELEVISION sector. | 2 | |||
| 3.2 | Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the audiovisual sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)? | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration. | 2 | |||
| 3.3 | Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:
| 2 | |||
| 3.4 | Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the television media. | 1.5 | |||
| Total | 7.5 out of 16 | |||||
| N° | MEDIA MERGERS | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.17 | Can a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector? | This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector specific and/ or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector through merging operations. For instance, the law should prevent concentration in merging operations: - By containing media-specific provisions that impose stricter thresholds than in other sectors; - The mandatory intervention of a media authority in merger and acquisition cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority); - The possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the communication authority for reasons of media pluralism (or public interest in general)); -that - even though they do not contain media-specific provisions - do not exclude the media sector from their scope of application. | 0.5 | |||
| 3.18 | Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with rules on mergers and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)? | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system. | 0.5 | |||
| 3.19 | Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioral and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:
| 1 | |||
| 3.20 | Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the television media. | 0.5 | |||
| Total | 2.5 out of 4 | |||||
SOURCES:
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Rule on media concentration and cross-ownership (archive.org) Official Gazette of BiH, No. 11/04
Cross-media Ownership Concentration
Result: High Risk
This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership across the different sectors – TV, print, audio, and any other relevant media – of the media industry. Cross-media concentration is measured by adding up the market shares of the Top 8 media companies. The results are not an indicator for economic strength in different media sectors but rather for the potential influence on public opinion when considering all media types.
Why?
The owners in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including three public broadcasters (BHRT, FTV and RTRS) have total revenue of 202 mln BAM, while the total revenue of the owners, excluding public broadcasters, is 91 mln BAM.
Top 8 owners, which include three public broadcasters, BC Partners, Azra Radončić, Trišić Family, Švrakić Family, Ivan Ćaleta, Kopanja Family and Šimić brothers have a total revenue of 180 mln BAM, while the revenue of Top 8 owners without public broadcasters is 73 mln BAM.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina the major 8 owners (with public broadcasters) have a market share of 89,29% while their market share without public broadcasters is 80,14%, which represents high risk. For most of them, financial data was available for 2021.
| N° | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Percentage:89.29% | ||
| If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share below 50% across the different media sectors. | If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have an audience share between 50% and 69% across the different media sectors. | If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share above 70% across the different media sectors. | |
SOURCES:
Financial–intelligence Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Agency for intermediary, IT and financial services
Regulatory Safeguards: Cross-media Ownership Concentration
Result: High Risk
This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership between media types (press, TV, radio, internet). Given the diversity of thresholds or limits that exist among different countries with regard to ownership and/or control, 'high' should be assessed according to the standards of your country and in the light of the thresholds or limits imposed by domestic laws.
Why?
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a dedicated law to regulate the field of media concentration, or monopoly, not to mention cross-sector ownership. While some laws address concentration per sector, the cross-sector aspect is not covered.
The Law on Communications of BiH obliges the Council of Ministers of BiH and Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA BiH, Agency) to promote fair competition and prevent distortion or restriction of competition in the communications sector. The law is limited to telecommunications, radio, broadcasting (including cable television), as well as associated services and facilities. One of the competencies of CRA is the granting of licences. In addition, its task is to “protect the plurality and diversity of the media (restriction of concentration), and above all else, to enable a continuous and uniform development of the radio sector in the country.” The obligation to report to CRA is foreseen for licence users. A failure to inform CRA of certain changes referring to ownership may result in sanctions (e.g. written warning). Licence users are also obliged to submit financial reports to CRA. This Law does not cover print and online media.
In the case of radio and television, the CRA rules related to the issuing and transferring of licences, may have a certain impact on media concentration. But not on cross-media concentration. They restrict the partial or complete transfer of licences to other users, by sale or special contract, in all cases when change in the original ownership of a licence user exceeds 5% of the share in the said licence. In these cases, the partial transfer of ownership requires a previous written consent by the Agency. While processing the request, the Agency examines the same conditions as in the process of licence issuance. There is no data on licences being refused or revoked in relation to concentration.
The Rule 21/2003 on media concentration of ownership of electronic and print media entered into force on April 1, 2004 and expired in 2006. The short-lived law allowed for a maximum 10% share in case an owner had multiple outlets in the same market, it also stipulated that one natural or legal person cannot be the owner of two or more radio or television stations which have the same population coverage ratio. This Rule also covered cross-media ownership: the Rule stipulates that one or more natural persons, who already own print media, are allowed to also own one electronic media, radio or TV station. Besides, the rules for limiting the mixed ownership stipulated that one natural or legal person can own one radio and one TV station for the population coverage ratio. The Rule entered into force on April 1, 2004 and expired in 2006, given that a new rule was not passed down within the period of 18 months nor was the existing rule reviewed and amended, as foreseen. In that sense, an adequate special regulatory framework for the issue of competition and concentration in the media market has been absent to this day.
All business entities are covered by the Law on Competition of BiH. Articles 12-19 define the term ‘concentration’, including what is considered prohibited concentration, turnover level for control of concentration, as well as measures in case of prohibited concentration. Those provisions do not treat media concentration in a distinct way.
Certain business entities have an obligation to notify the Competition Council of intended mergers and acquisitions that contribute to concentrations, while the Law on Competition provides for eligibility conditions, including the necessary data and business indicators. Companies are obliged to notify the authority on concentration if the total annual income of each of at least two business entities participants to the concentration generated through the sale of goods and/or services in the market of Bosnia and Herzegovina amounts to at least KM 8,000,000, or if their joint participation in the relevant market exceeds 40%; this also refer to media mergers and concentration issues. The law stipulates that a business entity has a dominant position when it holds more than 40% of the market share in the relevant market. Although the dominant position is not prohibited, its abuse is.
As regards the future, there is a Draft Law on Ownership Transparency and Protection of Media Pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina which highlights that the lack of regulation of media ownership prevents the state from adequately regulating ownership concentration, foreign ownership and conflict of interests in the media and related sectors. The Draft Law includes restrictions of diagonal concentration in radio and television broadcasting industry, as well as publication of daily newspapers depending on coverage range are also provided for as follows:
A television publisher may acquire up to 30% of stocks or shares, or founder's rights, in a publisher of the same range, and vice versa;
A state-level television and/or radio publisher may not acquire stocks or shares, or founder’s rights, in a daily newspaper publisher which has a share in the state territory that exceeds 40%, and vice versa;
A wide-range television publisher may acquire up to 40% of stocks or shares, or founder’s rights, in a narrow-range television publisher, or up to 30% of stocks or shares, or the founding rights, in a television publisher with two non-adjacent ranges (e.g. two non-adjacent cantons);
A wide-range radio publisher may acquire up to 40% of stocks or shares, or founder’s rights, in a narrow-range radio publisher, or up to 30% of stocks or shares, or founder’s rights, in a publisher with two narrow non-adjacent ranges (e.g. two non-adjacent ranges).
Regulatory Safeguards Score: 2.5 out of 8 (Regulation: 31.25%)
| N° | CROSS-MEDIA OWNERSHIP | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1 | Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds, based on objective criteria, such as number of licences, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high degree of cross-ownership between the different media? | This indicator aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors. | 0.5 | |||
| 5.2 | Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these thresholds and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media authority) | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration. | 0.5 | |||
| 5.3 | Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:
| X | |||
| 5.4 | Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | The relevant authority never uses its sanctioning powers. The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the regulation. | X | |||
| 5.5 | Can a high degree of cross-ownership between different media be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector? | For instance, cross-ownership can be prevented by comptetion law: - by the mandatory intervention of a media authority in M&A cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority); - by the possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the competition authority for reasons of media pluralism (or Public interest in general); | 0.5 | |||
| 5.6 | Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority) | This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors via merger control/competition rules. | 1 | |||
| 5.7 | Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds? | Examples sanctioning/enforcement powers and remedies: - blocking of a merger or acquisition; - obligation to allocate windows for third party programming; - must carryobligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors ; - divestiture. | X | |||
| 5.8 | Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used? | The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies of the regulation. | X | |||
| Total | 2.5 out of 8 | |||||
SOURCES:
Broadcasting Sector Policy Rak.ba
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Rule on media concentration and cross-ownership (archive.org) Official Gazette of BiH, No. 11/04
Ownership Transparency
Result: Medium Risk
This indicator assesses the transparency of data about the political affiliations of media owners as ownership transparency is a crucial precondition to enforce media pluralism.
Why?
Active transparency means company/channel informs proactively and comprehensively about its ownership, data is constantly updated and easily verifiable. MOM investigated a sample of 39 outlets and 30 companies. 8 outlets and 5 companies were ranked as Actively Transparent, i.e. 18,8% of the entire sample.
Passive Transparency means that upon request, ownership data is easily available from the company/from a channel. No media outlet or company were ranked passive transparent.
Data publicly available means ownership data is easily available from other sources, e. g. public registries etc. 30 outlets and 24 companies were ranked as Data Publicly Available, i.e. even if the websites didn’t inform them public of the owners those could be found in the public records such as the Registers of Business Entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this transparency ranking was used in 78,2% of cases.
Data unavailable means ownership data is not publicly available; company/channel denies the release of information or does not respond, no public record exists. 1 outlet and 1 company were ranked as data unavailable, representing 2,9% of the entire sample.
Active disguise means in addition to unavailability of true data, ownership is disguised, e. g. through bogus companies, or proxy ownerships etc. No media outlet or company has its data actively disguised.
| N° | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| TRANSPARENCY | |||
| 6.1 | How would you assess the transparency and accessibility of data about media ownership? Active Transparency – 18.8% Passive Transparency – 0% Data Publicly Available – 78.2% Data Unavailable – 2.9% Active Disguise - 0% | ||
Data on media owners as well as their political affiliations is publicly available and transparent. (Active Transparency) Code if that applies to > 75% of the sample | Data of media owners and their political affiliations are disclosed based on investigations of journalists and media activists or upon request. (Passive Transparency, Publicly Available) Code if that applies > 50% of the sample. | Data on political affiliations of media owners are not easily accessible by the public and investigative journalists of activists are not successful in disclosing these data. (Data Unavailable, Active Disguise) Code if data is available for < 50% of the sample | |
Regulatory Safeguards: Ownership Transparency
Result: Medium Risk
This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of transparency and disclosure provisions with regard to media ownership and/or control.
Why?
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not regulate the field of media concentration, monopoly or transparency of media ownership by separate laws. The set of laws, which should regulate the functioning of electronic media, transparency of media ownership and media advertising, in a uniform way have been on hold for many years. The transparency of media ownership is only partially regulated through the process of registration of media-owned businesses and organizations, as well as through the existence of a register of the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH on users of audiovisual and radio broadcasting licences. While some obligation to submit regular or periodic reports to different bodies-regulators exists on the basis of relevant laws (on communications, budget implementation, competition etc.), there is no systematic monitoring.
There are rules that cover all kinds of businesses and include media as well. Information on nominal owners of the media, which are registered as business entities, is available through municipal and district court registers. However, the data is not easily accessible and searchable, given that different data is in possession of nine municipal courts in the Federation of BiH and five district courts in Republika Srpska. For relevant media businesses, data is also kept by the Competition Council, but this data is not publicly available in an aggregated form, nor can it be found through a simple search of the Competition Council’s web page. Decisions of the Competition Council are published in the Official Gazette of BiH, official gazettes of the Entities and Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and contain names of parties to the proceeding, the main content of decisions, including penalties imposed. Those decisions provide certain data on affiliated entities, but without the names of owners and other data of importance. A large amount of business data is protected by provisions on observance of professional secrecy, so they are not available to the public.
As for media-specific measures: the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH keeps a register on users of audiovisual and radio broadcasting licences. A failure to inform CRA of certain changes referring to ownership may result in sanctions (e.g. written warning). Yet the register does not contain information on indirect and related owners and there is no framework for monitoring indirect or hidden owners, the origin of capital and related interests in the media. The register does not cover print and online media either. Data about CRA licence holders, which are published yearly through annual reports and user registers. These publicly accessible documents contain basic data about the title, seat, names of director and editor-in-chief, but not the data about ownership.
Nevertheless, relevant reports state that CRA demonstrates a very good responsiveness, i.e. it generally provides information on broadcasters’ owners upon request, without insisting on formal procedures and prior to the expiration of the deadline defined by the Freedom of Information Law. On the other hand, individual examples indicate that the information about owners, which is kept in different registers, is unadjusted.
Print and online media don’t have a legal obligation to submit any reports to the Print and Online Media Council – any publication of data is based on self-regulation. They have obligations arising from their status as business entities or associations, provided that they registered their activity in BiH at all.
The media currently operating only in online format are usually registered as associations of citizens or classic business entities in accordance with law at various levels. For entities registered as business entities operating online media, for example limited liability entities in area, ownership structure is available in court and other registries, not consolidated. For online media operation as civil society organizations, the information on the founders is also available in court registries. A significant portion of online media-web portals are not registered in any way apart from the registration of the domain name. There is no uniform register of online media given that the data about their registration are stored in different court records depending on the place of registration (e.g. at the level of Republika Srpska entity and at the level of individual cantons in FBiH).
A certain level of transparency is possible for online media with the national domain (.ba) owing to data provided by the University Tele-Informatic Center (UTIC), which is in charge of issuing ‘.ba’ domains. On UTIC’s website it is possible to determine ownership of any site with the national domain, but nevertheless, the information does not offer a detailed insight into the existence of indirect or affiliated owners.
Regulatory Safeguard Score:
2.5 out of 5 – Medium Risk (50%)
| N° | Transparency Provisions | Description | Yes + | No - | NA | MD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1 | Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to publish their ownership structures on their website or in records/documents that are accessible to the public? | The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for transparency towards the citizens, the users and the public in general. | 0.5 | |||
| 7.2 | Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to report (changes in) ownership structures to public authorities (such as the media authority)? | The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for accountability and transparency towards public authorities. | 1 | |||
| 7.3 | Is there an obligation by national law to disclose relevant information after every change in ownership structure? | This question aims at assessing if the law provides rules on the public availability of accurate and up-to-date data on media ownership. This is a condition for an effective transparency. | 0.5 | |||
| 7.4 | Are there any sanctions in case of non-respect of disclosure obligations? | This question aims at assessing if the law on media ownership transparency can be enforced through the application of sanctions. | 0.5 | |||
| 7.5 | Do the obligations ensure that the public knows which legal or natural person effectively owns or controls the media company? | This question aim at assessing the effectiveness of the laws that deal with media ownership transparency and if they succeed in disclosing the real owners of the media outlets. | x | |||
| Total (Mean of L-e und L-I sub-indicators) | 2.5 out of 5 | |||||
SOURCES:
Political Control Over Media Outlets
Result: Medium Risk
This indicator assesses the risk of political affiliations and control over editorial independence of newsrooms. It also assesses the level of interference by politically affiliated actors in the work of news media.
Why?
The political influence on TV stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is expressed and felt, both through programs dedicated to news and interpretation of news and events, as well as through educational or other content that conveys a certain political view, mostly the one concerning the nature of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its current political system or future.
Control over TV stations can also be direct political control by a political option, the one in the opposition or the one in power. Efforts to put TV stations under control can be seen both for public broadcasters and also private outlets.
A similar political effort is felt towards the most read print media in the country, where their connection with political parties and individuals can be traced through the ownership structure and the interpretation of social and political events.
Radio stations and online media are freer compared to TV and print media, but the influence of political options is still worrying considering that the percentage of possible use of leverage within the sample of the most read and listened media exceeds one third of the entire sample. A frequent reason for concern lies in the political affiliation of the owners or the simple fact that some radio stations or portals are owned by politically biased media.
There are no functional mechanisms that would prevent a conflict of interest in cases where media ownership is exercised by a person holding a political office. Moreover, such connections are often not hidden and are part of common knowledge.
Score: 16/7 = 2.42 Medium Risk
| N° | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| POLITICISATION OF MEDIA OUTLETS | |||
| 8.1 | What is the share of TV media owned by politically affiliated entities? | ||
| The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50% >30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | |
| 8.2 | What is the share of Radio stations owned by politically affiliated entities? | ||
| The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | |
| 8.3 | What is the share of Newspapers owned by politically affiliated entities? | ||
| The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | |
| 8.4 | What is the share of Online News Media owned by politically affiliated entities? MD | ||
| The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having <50%>30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician, or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation. | |
| 8.5 | To what degree is politically affiliated ownership transparent? The majority of politically controlled media are secretive about their related financial interests. | ||
| There is only limited politically affiliated ownership in the country and in all cases, the owners and their interests are disclosed to the public. | The majority of politically controlled news media are transparent about their ownership and interests. | The majority of politically controlled media are secretive about their ownership and interests. | |
| 8.6 | Are there laws that regulate conflicts of interests between media ownership and political parties, partisan groups, party members, office holders and relatives? | ||
| There is clear and effective regulation that highlights the incompatibility of political office (on the local, regional, national level) with media ownership and requires transparency in the case of other political offices. | There is regulation, but only covers some politically affiliated groups (effectively). | There is no regulation, or regulation is ineffective. | |
| 8.7 | Do politically partisan owners or other political interest systematically interfere with the editorial autonomy of newsrooms? NO DATA | ||
| The available evidence suggests very few or no attempts at interfering with editorial autonomy. | The available evidence suggests occasional interferences and/or some degree of self-censorship in newsrooms. | The available evidence suggests systemic interference with editorial autonomy, which may or may not be accompanied by self-censorship in newsrooms. | |
| 8.8 | To what extent is editorial independence guaranteed in editorial statutes or in self-regulatory mechanisms? | ||
| Most news media in the country guarantee editorial independence in their statutes, or they subscribe to self-regulatory codes that do so. | The most prestigious news media in the country guarantee editorial independence in their statutes, or they subscribe to self-regulatory codes that do so. | Neither editorial statutes, nor self-regulation mentions editorial independence, or the guidelines are not respected by newsrooms. | |
Political Control Over Infrastructure
Result: Medium Risk
This indicator assesses the political control over important infrastructural layers in the distribution, as well as in the value and supply chains of media content. It also assesses the level of discrimination in favour of politically affiliated media distribution networks. Infrastructural elements are in most cases privately owned and access is provided to news publishers for a fee.
Why?
Having in mind the importance of TV as a media and its reach among the population, political affiliation of at least one distributor is alarming. State regulatory agency is in charge of licensing rights for airwave distribution of signals. Their management and governing body have been criticized for political interference but licensing of TV stations have been regularly fair so far.
But the challenge remains within the cable operators who have significant roles and reach. Some battles for markets that happened in Serbia also had effect in Bosnia and Herzegovina as cable operators who also own TV channels are keen on airing competition news channels rather than having only their own.
Cable and digital TV provider companies are often also the internet providing entity. Some of them actively block certain programs and channels that may be considered politically critical of their owners or affiliated political option, in Bosnia and Herzegovina or Serbia.
As the number of printed editions is shrinking and circulation of the remaining few dailies is getting smaller, print distribution companies are losing their influence over the control of the content available in different parts of the country. Most of the companies are focused on selling other content locally rather than leaning on print editions. Some of the media have distributing companies themselves, made earlier to overcome costs and control over distribution. Distribution challenges, due to the complex post war country political system, are more on the side of political divisions nowadays rather than market control as all newspapers have online editions available to all. Data on distribution companies in Bosnia is not unified and due to inconsistent data we have not given a final indicator remark.
Radio distribution is almost entirely controlled by the state regulatory agency which is licensing radio stations. Budget limitations to build radio towers is a bigger obstacle for radio stations rather than limitations imposed by the regulator.
Score: 1.8 Medium Risk
| Nº | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| POLITICISATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE | |||
| 9.1 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading distribution networks for print media? NO DATA | ||
| Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. | |
| 9.2 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading radio distribution networks? | ||
| Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. | |
| 9.3 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading television distribution networks? | ||
| Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. | |
| 9.4 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading internet distribution networks? | ||
| Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. | At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions. | All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. | |
| 9.5 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading service providers in the advertising market? | ||
| There is no indication that major commercial advertising agencies / sales houses would discriminate against independent media. | At least one of the leading commercial advertising agencies / sales houses discriminates against independent media due to political affiliations (despite having a significant audience share). | Independent news media don’t have access to commercial advertising agencies / sales houses discriminating against independent media due to political affiliations (despite having a significant audience share). | |
| 9.6 | How would you assess the conduct of the leading audience measurement services? | ||
| Audience measurement services are in practice available to all relevant market players and comply with industry standards; transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity and inclusiveness of the methodology and the service is guaranteed. | At least one of the leading audience measurement services raises concerns related to transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity, and/or inclusiveness. | All of the leading audience measurement services raise concerns related to transparency, non-discrimination, proportionality, objectivity, and/or inclusiveness. | |
State Control Over Media Resources
Result: High Risk
This indicator assesses the influence of the state on the functioning of the media market, through control over public funds and resources, with an emphasis on the risk of discrimination in the distribution of state support and advertisement. The discrimination can be reflected in favouritism towards political parties or affiliates of political parties in the government, or in penalising the media criticising the government.
Why?
The distribution of state funds to the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including state marketing, regardless of the level of government involved, represents fertile ground for potential hidden channeling of money to the media preferred by the distributor of funds.
Funds, whether distributed directly or indirectly, are distributed disproportionately and without clear consideration of data that is key to audience reach, such as viewership share and regional signal distribution. The lack of clarity in the decision-making rules, that is, the lack of rules, creates strong reasons for doubting the fairness of distribution and doubting political benefit, bearing in mind the alarming indicators concerning the political power over individual watched media in all four markets.
State resources available to the media, not related to financial support, such as state news agencies, are not without political influence and free interpretation of the news that may correspond to the political options in power.
Also, the public RTV service has been assessed on several occasions as susceptible to political influence, and financing is problematic, especially when it comes to BHT1, a major factor in the professional freedom of journalists.
Score: 2.37 High Risk
| N° | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10.1 | Is state advertising distributed to media proportionately to their audience share? | ||
| State advertising is distributed to the media relatively proportionately to the audience shares of media. | State advertising is distributed disproportionately (in terms of audience share) to the media. | State advertising is distributed exclusively to few media outlets, which do not cover all major media outlets in the country. | |
| 10.2 | How would you assess the rules of distribution of state advertising? | ||
| State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on fair and transparent rules. | State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on a set of rules but it is unclear whether they are fair and transparent. | There are no rules regarding distribution of state advertising to media outlets or these are not transparent and/or fair. | |
| IMPORTANCE OF STATE ADVERTISING | |||
| 10.3 | What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Radio advertising market? Missing Data | ||
| Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market | Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market | Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market | |
| 10.4 | What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Radio advertising market? Missing Data | ||
| Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market. | |
| 10.5 | What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Newspaper advertising market? Missing Data | ||
| Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market. | |
| 10.6 | What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall Online news media advertising market (without amounts spent on news intermediaries)? Missing Data | ||
| Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market. | Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market. | |
| 10.7 | Is direct financial support distributed fairly, transparently and based on clear rules? | ||
| There are clear rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies and, in practice, subsidies are transparently and fairly allocated (criteria may not only be based on market share, but also public interest content, underserved communities, the need for innovation, etc.) | The rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies are either not clear or the process of allocation lacks sufficient transparency or shows signs of political bias. | There are no rules on the allocation of direct state subsidies and/or the allocation of subsidies is opaque and/or clearly discriminatory. | |
| 10.8 | Is indirect financial support distributed fairly, transparently and based on clear rules? | ||
| There are clear rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies and, in practice, access to indirect subsidies is transparent and fair. | The rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies are either not clear or the process of allocation lacks sufficient transparency or shows signs of political bias. | There are no rules on the allocation of indirect state subsidies and/or the allocation of indirect subsidies is opaque and/or clearly discriminatory. | |
| 10.9 | Do all media outlets have access to the state-financed news agency, and do they receive quality content relevant for their news production? | ||
| There is a state-financed news agency in the country that is accessible to all news media under the same (and fair) conditions, providing objective, well-sourced information. | There are some concerns related to access to the state financed news agency or possible bias in the content provided. | Access to the state-owned news agency causes unnecessary burden for some news media and/or its content is biased. | |
| 10.10 | Do you consider the financing of the PSM independent and adequate? | ||
| The financing of the PSM is adequate, without distorting competition with private media; and the process includes sufficient guarantees against political dependencies (e.g. through licence fees)? | The financing of the PSM is insufficient or could distort competition with private media; and the funding process may enable political dependencies? | The financing is insufficient to a degree that quality journalism is not or hardly possible and/or the funding process is clearly under political control. | |
| 10.11 | How do you assess the independence of the appointment and dismissal process of the PSM management? | ||
| There are clear rules on the appointment and dismissal of the PSM management, independence from political actors is guaranteed; and in practice appointments and dismissal decisions are made based on professional considerations. | Appointment and dismissal rules of PSM management may allow for some political influence and/or the practice of appointments and dismissals shows signs of bias. | Rules on appointment and dismissal of PSM management clearly enable political influence and/or appointments and/or dismissals are clearly politically motivated. | |
Regulatory Safeguards: Net Neutrality
Result: High Risk
Network neutrality is the principle that all data on networks should be treated equally by not discriminating or charging differently in terms of users, content, sites or applications. Protecting net neutrality is essential to safeguarding media diversity because it guarantees equal ability to access and disseminate information, opinions, perspectives, etc. online, which is essential to media diversity. This indicator aims to capture the landscape of legal regulation of net neutrality as well as the specific regulatory mechanisms that address net neutrality.
Why?
In addition to constitutional and legal guarantees, which promote and protect the freedom of expression in BiH, including the freedom of access to information, there are no separate laws governing the issue of network neutrality.
However, there are some relevant documents for the discussion on network neutrality, which contribute to a framework for implementation of network neutrality:
Rule 60/2012 on execution of activities of Internet access provider, which provides for an obligation of ISPs to enable end users, through their Internet service, to have an unimpeded access to all publicly available content and services offered on the Internet. Exceptions are content or services the use of which would establish an express illegality or criminal offence. In that sense, the ISP is obliged to ensure the provision of the Internet service with respect to the declared transfer rate, amount of traffic and other technical aspects included in the package of services.
Decision on adoption of Electronic Communications Sector Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2017-2021, alongside the Policy implementation action plan, set the ensuring of technical prerequisites for the realisation of broadband Internet access for all users, in particular schools and education institutions, as one of the priorities within the measures for further development of broadband network infrastructure and broadband services based on it. Moreover, as regards new technologies, it highlights the importance of development of optical networks FTTx (Fiber To The X) which will enable high transfer rates. The Agency will follow the new development trends and encourage the introduction of new services, such as: Future Internet, Machine to Machine - M2M, Internet of Things - IoT, Cloud Computing and Big Data, and take certain regulatory measures, as need be, taking into consideration the best practices in EU Member States.
The Stabilization and Association Agreement provides for an obligation to strengthen cooperation in the area of electronic communications networks and electronic communications services, with the ultimate objective of adoption by Bosnia and Herzegovina of the EU acquis. The Annual Report of CRA for 2020 states that Agency experts participate in education on the subject of broadband internet access strategy, network neutrality and international roaming, which would mean that CRA is taking steps aimed at following the process relating to network neutrality.
The Law on Communications provides that the CRA may adopt a code of conduct or prohibit certain conduct by telecommunication operators, or annul contracts and consider them partially or completely invalid, in case the concerned telecommunications operator abuses its significant market power. Prior to taking such measures, the Agency shall request the concerned telecommunications operator to stop the contested abuse within the relevant deadline.
In case a telecommunications operator with significant market power provides itself or its partner companies with access to services it offers internally, or to services it offers in the market under more favourable conditions than the conditions under which other competitors can use such services as part of their services, it is considered an abuse. This relates to the obligation of open access to network and interface.
Infringements and types of penalties that may be imposed by CRA are further specified in a document titled an Overview of Infringements and Appropriate Penalties Imposed by the Communications Regulatory Agency. In the Section titled Infringements of Special Obligations in Telecommunications, it is provided that an operator which interferes with telecommunications network or service with its actions shall be liable to a fine of KM 2,000 - 50,000. An operator which does not stop the interference within the deadline set in the Agency’s order shall be liable to a fine of KM 10,000 – 150,000.
The recent CRA reports and a review of penalties imposed do not give information on penalties imposed for infringements mentioned above, so it is not possible to assess the implementation effectiveness.
Regulatory Safeguards score: 1.5 out 11 = 13.6% (High Risk)
| NET NEUTRALITY | Description | Yes | No | NA | MD | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Does national law address net neutrality directly or indirectly? | neutrality is regulated by domestic law in any way; it also aims to reflect any agreement between countries, as in the EU and countries that are part of the Council of Europe. | 0.5 | ||||
| Does national law contain norms that prohibit blocking of websites or content online? | This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent blocking, one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework | 0.5 | ||||
| Does national law contain norms that prohibit throttling of services or content provided online? | This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent throttling, one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework | x | ||||
| Does national law contain norms that prohibit zero-rating and/or paid prioritization? | This question determines the degree to which a country’s net neutrality norms prevent zero-rating (of which paid prioritization is a common form), one of the key components of a robust net neutrality framework | x | ||||
| Where net neutrality is protected by law, does the legal framework recognize any exceptions, e.g. for reasonable network management? | This question establishes when reasonable limits are placed on net neutrality protections versus other limits that may undermine its effectiveness. | 0.5 | ||||
| Norms that prohibit or limit zero-rating are successfully implemented: Paid prioritization does not take place. | This question aims to flesh out the extent to which paid prioritization occurs in practice despite its prohibition in law; a number of countries with ostensibly strong zero-rating protections experience this phenomenon. This indicator may shed light on the degree of difference between law and practices on the ground | x | ||||
| Norms that prohibit or limit zero-rating are successfully implemented: No other forms of zero-rating take place. | Same as above | x | ||||
| Norms are successfully implemented: Blocking and/or throttling do not take place. | This question seeks to determine how the legal framework in place to protect net neutrality operates in practice with respect to blocking and throttling | x | ||||
| Are there regulatory or other entities charged with monitoring and enforcing net neutrality protections? | This question highlights whether there are authorities charged with enforcing net neutrality protections | x | ||||
| Have sanctions been imposed for violations of net neutrality protections where these exist? | This question may illustrate the extent to which violations of net neutrality norms are taken seriously as a matter of rule of law and political will | x | ||||
| Are the enforcement mechanisms in place to identify and respond to net neutrality violations viewed as effective? | This question shows the extent to which net neutrality norms actually achieve their goals | x | ||||
| Total (Mean of L-e und L-I sub-indicators) | 1.5 | |||||
Gender Imbalance in the Media Industry
Result: High Risk
This indicator assesses the representation of women in news media, focusing on relevant newsroom policies and the share of women in management positions.
Why?
Women journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina are often subject to harassment or online and offline violence. Cases of violence are reported and harassment of women journalists is common in the country, with many known and reported cases. The Association of “BH Journalists” have been running since 2019 a special database of attacks on female journalists and have recorded 110 cases of attacks, threats and insults related to female journalists.
When it comes to the share of women among owners of leading TV news media outlets, there is 18 percent of women. In radio outlets, it is 30 percent, in print 62,5 and in online 40 percent of women. Out of 39 media outlets, there are 37,62 percent of women among owners. However, it is important to point out that out of this 37,62% percent, just in two cases a woman is the only owner (Azra Radončić, the owner of Avaz.ba and Avaz daily). In all other cases, women share the ownership with men.
The average share of women among founders of news media in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 20,75 percent. In TV outlets, there are 18 percent of women founders, in radio 20 percent, in print 25 percent, in online 20 percent. In no case did a woman found a news media by herself out of these 39. In all cases it was founded by women with one or two men.
Also, information about the founder of the media is not always available. Sometimes, just the name of the company is available, hence the numbers represent a percentage of the media where the natural person is known. Also, out of these 39 media outlets, there are three public broadcasters, whose founders are institutions.
The average share of women amongst top managers of news media (such as director/CEO) is 28,5 percent or 27 percent in tv outlets, 20 percent in radio, 37 percent in print and 30 percent in online. The average share of women editors-in-chief is 26,2 percent. In TV outlets this percentage is 20, in radio 30, in print 25 and in online 30 percent.
Score: 2.8 High Risk
| N° | LOW (1) | MEDIUM (2) | HIGH (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12.1 | Do the leading news media in your country have a policy aiming at a balanced representation of women in the newsroom? NO DATA | ||
| Most leading news media have a gender equality policy or other kinds of self-regulatory measures to make sure that there is adequate representation of women in the newsrooms and in management positions. Moreover, there are mechanisms at place to make sure women in the newsroom don’t encounter harassment or discrimination. | Some news media have a gender equality policy or other kinds of self-regulatory measures to make sure that there is adequate representation of women in the newsrooms and in management positions. In these news media, there are mechanisms at place to make sure women in the newsroom don’t encounter harassment or discrimination. | There is no gender equality policy in the newsrooms assessed, or they are not effective, leading to discrimination and harassment of female journalists. | |
| 12.2 | Are women journalists subject to harassment or online/ offline violence in your country? | ||
| The working environment of women journalists is safe, harassment online or offline is not common, sufficient safeguards are in place. | Both men and women are harassed to a similar extent, (physical) violence against female journalists is not common. | Cases of violence are reported and harassment of women journalists is common in the country, with many known and reported cases. Women are considered to be more targeted by harassment and violence than men. | |
| 12.3 | What is the share of women among owners of leading news media?
Average of VALUES: 37.62% | ||
| 40 percent or more | Between 39 and 30 percent | Less than 30 percent | |
| 12.4 | What is the share of women among founders of news media?
Average of VALUES: 20.75% | ||
| 40 percent or more | Between 39 and 30 percent | Less than 30 percent | |
| 12.5 | What is the share of women amongst top managers of news media (such as the CEO)?
Average of VALUES: 28.5% | ||
| 40 percent or more | Between 39 and 30 percent | Less than 30 percent | |
| 12.6 | What is the share of women in key editorial positions in the newsroom (such as leading editors or editor-in-chief )?
Average of VALUES: 26.2% | ||
| 40 percent or more | Between 39 and 30 percent | Less than 30 percent | |
| 12.7 | What is the share of women in key (board) positions in the newsroom (meaning non-editorial management positions, such as chief financial officer, head of sales and marketing, etc.)? NO DATA | ||
| 40 percent or more | Between 39 and 30 percent | Less than 30 percent | |
